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Is Antigone a hero or a self-impelled victim? Judith Butler and other contemporary theorists have turned to Antigone as an inspiration for activist heroism, presenting her as a venerable archetype for resistance. But does this use of Antigone give fair due to her tragic circumstances and family loyalties? Jacques Lacan’s analysis of the Antigone prompts the question of whether such interpretations are not attempts to redeem and beautify the monstrous. This examination of Antigone questions what is ethically salient about her and challenges the assumption that her defiance of the state is heroic.


HEROISM IN SOPHOCLES’ ANTIGONE

I
Speaking to the many changing interpretations of the Antigone, George Steiner writes that, “As it comes to us from Sophocles’ Antigone, ‘meaning’ is bent out of its original shape just as starlight is bent when it reaches us across time and via successive gravitational fields.”1 Hegel’s fundamental notion that the Antigone is about the conflict between two opposing but equal rights of the family and the state remains important to Jacques Lacan and Judith Butler, but emphasis is given to fascination for her unbending and self-certain character. The uncanny quality of Antigone’s self-certainty captivates Lacan as a kind of unbearable splendor (éclat insupportable) that radiates from her; for Butler this quality allows Antigone to become a pliable figure for activism. Antigone’s defiance of Creon and the civil law as a guardian of the family and her own moral-religious beliefs poses her as a figure of resistance whose claim to burial challenges the regular functioning of the polis (πόλιϛ). In Antigone’s Claim, Butler asks how the tragic figure of Antigone can enrich the dialogue on those today whose locations, like hers, do not fit into the proper functioning of the ruling hegemony.
Jacques Lacan, one of Butler’s chosen interlocutors on the Antigone, is also interested in the play as a vehicle for ethical reflection. Although Lacan’s study of the play within the context of psychoanalysis has very different aims than those of Butler’s, his observations on Antigone’s splendor nevertheless make for an interesting challenge to more contemporary views (like Butler’s) who shape Antigone as activist hero. In Book VII of his seminars, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan suggests that we should be wary of that wondrous sheen that emanates from Antigone and consider more carefully what it is about this “self-willed victim” (cette victime si terriblement volontaire) that makes her admirable.2 Antigone faces a forced or impossible choice imposed upon her by Creon, defies Creon and the state, but not in the name of some social “good”: instead, Lacan states, her resistance is motivated by her familial love for her brother who she considers irreplaceable.  
As contemporaries it is exciting to conceptualize Antigone’s defiance as an expression of humanist values that undermine the patriarchal order of things, but as Hegel asserted, and many others since have reinforced, Antigone’s “defiance” of Creon reveals her commitment (or obedience) to her other role as sister-daughter and inheritor of her family Atè (translated as misfortune, atrocity). Lacan adds to this the observation that Antigone’s dedication to Polyneices reaches beyond what the demands of the chthonic laws would normally require and pushes her further towards her Atè, even beyond it or εκτòς άτας (EP, p. 277).  
Following Lacan, it seems pertinent to inquire further into the nature of Antigone’s heroism and her status of criminality in relation to the polis. Very simply, it may be asked of her: for what reason and at what costs? Is her predicament as a woman who refuses to follow the demands of the state (in terms of Creon, but also in terms of not providing an heir) sufficient enough to align her with those today who face isolation because of their sexual orientation and/or family relationships as Butler suggests? If the kind of desire Antigone represents not only destroys herself but also harms those living around her, how can such a desire represent something “good” like a new category of sexuality in which the formerly silenced people (gay, lesbian, etc.) now have a place to live and be heard? To pose the question to Butler and other contemporary voices: what is ethically salient about Antigone that allows her to become heroic for contemporary visions of political activism?  
Perhaps it is Antigone’s tragic predicament that compels us contemporaries to retroactively project a morally redeemable future onto her. Her predicament is so unbearable in its splendor, to use Lacan’s terms, that we impose our own anamorphic image of beauty on her, one which sadly takes a drastic departure from the therapeutic value of tragedy itself. For, as Friedrich Nietzsche would ask, how can tragedy be healing and connect us to the universality of human suffering if we feel the need to justify it?3
II
Butler seeks to ask how “being human” requires membership within hetero-normative family relationships.4 She believes that Antigone’s “impure” kinship status in relation to Oedipus, and in terms of her incestuous love for her brother Polyneices, are what allow her to become an example for those whose lives are also considered “impure.” Her active claim to kinship from a position in which her kinship status itself is both multiple and unclear destabilizes the normalizing functions of kinship and their cultural intelligibility, according to Butler. This makes Antigone an interesting figure for those whose kinship relations are not quite intelligible today, but nevertheless claim it, those who “perform” it through the repetition of its practices without adhering to the models that define it (AC, p. 58).   
Butler wants to know if Antigone’s deviant expression of kinship opens up the possibility for the laws that govern kinship to be modified (p. 67). She is concerned specifically with the hetero-normative domination of family relationships in the social field and the exclusionary practices that arise from this domination. Butler believes that since both her father Oedipus and her brother Polyneices are her brother, Antigone’s appeal to her brother’s name recalls and multiplies the terms of kinship in such a way that they are displaced. In a contemporary setting, she compares this to the flexibility of the terms “mother” and “father” that occur with gay parents, in single parent families, or in situations in which families (due to divorce, adoption, etc.) have more than one parent (p. 69).  
The reason Antigone can be employed in a contemporary context to speak about resistance is because Butler believes her to be making a demand within the language of the state and, in doing so, to be acting with agency. Butler critiques the Hegelian view that posits Antigone and Creon as oppositional actors and instead claims that they are each invested in and dependent upon one another in their conflict (p. 10). Antigone’s agency is grounded in her performative refusal of Creon’s edict: firstly through burying Polyneices’ body and secondly, in her public refusal of his authority. By adopting the language of Creon and speaking in the public domain (in a place that was exclusive to men) she momentarily usurps him, speaking like a man she silences him and threatens to make him feminine (AC, p. 9). 
Antigone’s power, for Butler, lies in her ability to transgress the regulative functioning of both kinship and the political through speech acts. Her performative demand in the name of her brother (for a love that is incestuous) in an assumed masculine language of the state reveals the potential malleability of gender roles, family relationship and the law of the state. Although Antigone does not provide a clear alternative to hetero-normative structures of kinship, her journey allows for an important consideration of the limits of representation and the capacity of speech acts to undermine authoritarian rule. Butler believes that Antigone opens the door to the political possibility that the rules of kinship can be re-written though the performative re-articulation of its laws in confrontation with the state.  
III
Lacan is primarily concerned with Antigone’s unyielding love for her brother and what this can reveal about desire. While he acknowledges the classical Hegelian interpretation which places Creon’s and Antigone’s interests on two different poles of representation, as has already been noted, he believes Antigone’s unwavering commitment to bury her brother pushes her further than the demands of the chthonic laws require (EP, p. 277). For Lacan, Antigone comes to stand for that experience of desire for a thing with a capital T that is irreplaceable: a desire that compels the suspension of our critical judgment. Antigone’s beauty, Lacan states, as well as our fascination with her has to do with what appears to be her self-knowledge and her unbending character expressed through her radical and unwavering passion and dedication to the burial of her brother. “In effect, Antigone reveals to us the line of sight that defines desire” (p. 247). Her desire for her brother is irreplaceable and, as such, her life has no meaning unless she is able to fulfill her desire to bury him. Antigone’s love for her brother demonstrates the amoral, irrational and dangerous potential of desire without limits.
According to Lacan, Antigone radicalizes Polyneices’ particularity as her brother without founding it upon his personal history. Antigone’s proclamation of her brother’s singularity refers to a type of legality without any content. It affirms his pure being.5 Lacan explains that this occurs when Antigone states that she is not following the orders of Zeus or the gods of the underworld, but rather another type of legality uniquely linked to her brother Polyneices who is άθαπτος (from the same womb) and is of the same father (p. 279).6 Antigone does not name or explain what this legality is beyond the fact that it is for her brother who is irreplaceable: “Involved here is an invocation of something that is, in effect, of the order of law, but which is not developed in any signifying chain or in anything else” (EP, p. 278).  
The singular and unwavering logic of Antigone’s desire for her brother compels her towards and beyond her family Atè. Her mind cannot be changed, not by the logic of her sister Ismene or by the law of Creon. Lacan calls Antigone both “victim and holocaust” for her active fulfillment of her tragic bloodline (p. 282). Thus, it is not only that she succumbs to moira (fate), but that she purposively and knowingly activates it with an eye towards her own destruction. Her capacity to both attract and repel us lies in her predicament of living between life and death: she invites death into life and in doing so removes herself from the regular movement of life (EP, p. 248). She is, according to Lacan, “someone who had already set her sights on death” and for this reason is not to be understood as a figure of human defiance (p. 286).    
Lacan points out that in lines 559-560 Antigone states that her destiny is to serve the dead (p. 270). Her desire circles around her family and its beyond: “something beyond the limits of Atè has become Antigone’s good” (EP, p. 270).  She lives in a “limit zone” between life and death, her “race is run” (EP, p. 272). It is from her limit zone that she laments all that life has refused her (love, marriage, children: see lines 891-928 of the Antigone) and from it that the personal extent of her tragedy is exposed.  But it is also from this place that Antigone admits the absolute priority of her brother above all. Lacan is interested in Antigone’s lamentation because, he says, it is during this time that the extent of her desire and its effect on us are exposed. Antigone’s steadfast commitment to the burial of her brother makes her radiate beauty. She appeals to our humanist values.  At the same time, we are taken in by Antigone’s completion of her family’s ill fortune, her Atè. She, like her father and brothers before her, yields to the family curse. This coincidence suspends our judgment and we experience the full effects of her tragedy.
IV
When Butler summarizes the revolutionary potential of Antigone at the end of Antigone’s Claim she writes, “Antigone is the occasion for a new field of the human, achieved through political catachresis, the one that happens when the less than human speaks as human, when gender is displaced, and kinship founders on its own founding laws” (p. 82). Antigone wants to be a part of society, according to Butler, but her incestuous love for her brother (as well as her other problematic family relationships) and her discursive enactment of male gender prevent her from this. Through her performance of gender and her refusal to follow political authority she acquires more than a criminal status; she comes to represent, for Butler, an agent of refusal against the assimilation of hetero-normative kinship and state laws. That Antigone pays for this dearly with her life is not crucial for Butler because, like Antigone, gays and lesbians who do not conform to kinship and gender norms are made invisible and in this way they too live a life that is already socially dead.  
In Butler’s account, the unbending and repressive laws of the state take on a much greater responsibility for Antigone’s death than her own destructive drive. But, does Butler dignify Antigone’s self-certain gaze and subsequently present us with a hero who is reduced to her political actions (or even the political repercussions of her actions)? How can this woman who is called ώμός by the Chorus, roughly translated as inflexible by Lacan, but also meaning raw and uncivilized (EP, p. 263) be conceived without her Atè?
Throughout the Oedipus series, Antigone is presented as a woman whose life is linked to and lived through her family loyalties. In Oedipus at Colonus Antigone is her father’s eyes, guiding and providing for him throughout his wanderings; she remains with him until death. After Oedipus dies, Antigone requests that her sister kill her there so she can die at her father’s side.7 It is only once this is denied to her by Theseus, who informs her that it is forbidden to go to her father’s grave, that she turns her gaze to her brothers, first in hopes of stopping the war of her brothers and then to the burial of Polyneices. Antigone is determined above all to keep the honor of her family. She is fulfilling the most important aspect of her feminine role, as ruler over the family, to bury the dead: she is very much aware of the “crime” she is committing against the state and Creon, but does so as a good sister/daughter confident in her own understanding of what is just. Antigone states that she follows an unwritten law (EP 278).  
After the death of Oedipus, Antigone’s brother gains a surplus value: he comes to figure for her as all that is valuable in life, as a symbol of her family honor and personal fidelity; also as a replacement for everything she did not have: children, a husband, a life without the family Atè. As such, she is completely fixated on Polyneices and her individual significance is bound up in the fulfillment of her desire to bury him. Contrary to what Butler may suggest, this fixation is not activist in nature; it is not done for the sake of some political beliefs or “glory” that aims to challenge the state. There is no dilemma for Antigone because her commitment to her family and love for her brother make her need to bury him an unquestionable and necessary deed. Antigone is driven by her desire, a desire which recognizes no limits because it is connected to her identity as the daughter of Oedipus and Jocasta. Her last link to the family honor and her personal identity is found in Polyneices.      
The use of Antigone as a figure to represent non-normative family relationships that challenge the state is an approach that must overlook much of the story of the tragedy itself to be successful. Antigone’s splendor is both disturbing and entrancing, she is uncanny, and for this reason it is tempting to make her into someone she is not and forget her tragic origins. Butler’s redeeming beautification of Antigone in this respect is of a queer-feminist hero. But, perhaps the gift of Antigone is not one of resistance, but rather the dark wisdom of a fated woman whose life illustrates to us, as Lacan states, the amoral and dangerous character of desire, but also and more than this, the peril of living a life of sacrifice where one has nothing of one’s own, and where one’s very sense of self is bound up in something beyond oneself such as a set of moral-religious beliefs or the family honor.  
Most of her life Antigone has served her father and in his death Polyneices is the only replacement. What prevents Antigone from replacing Polyneices with Haemon is not only her dedication to her family honor, but also her concept of self: she does not know who she is beyond the family and its Atè. The prospect of replacing Polyneices with Haemon is too drastic of a crisis for Antigone; doing so would threaten her identity. Antigone has never had the opportunity to develop her femininity or womanhood because she has always lived in the public world with her father as his guide and interpreter. The very concept of being a wife is foreign to her. As Oedipus himself expresses in Oedipus at Colonus of Antigone, “you never thought of home or comfort in comparison with the need to earn your father the means to live” (SI, p. 95). What is more, in this section, lines 340-344, Oedipus discusses how his two daughters are more like men than their brothers.  
Butler’s insight on Antigone’s gender is correct in one regard: it lies somewhere in between male and female, but this “gender trouble” is not productive for Antigone. Antigone’s multiple kin and gender locations contribute to her crisis, her lack of sense of self, her implacable need to subsume herself under the family honor and her singular love for Polyneices which leads to her death. Antigone’s problem is very much a feminist one: she herself lacks content apart from her role as kin of Oedipus and Polyneices.  Her last thread of self-definition is this promise of burial. “To Antigone, life itself has become equated with a total commitment to the duties and fatalities of kinship” (GS, p. 278). What drives her is the horror of her family and her commitment to them, outside of any concern for who she might be or could be apart from their Atè.  
V
Antigone resists: she refuses Creon’s demands, she acts out of her own desire, and instead of committing herself to the will of Hades she kills herself.  Antigone faces a forced or impossible choice: “obey me or die!” imposed upon her by Creon and her agonistic reaction undermines the presumed universality of his authority on multiple levels.8 The chorus doubts Creon, Haemon doubts Creon and eventually Creon even doubts himself. Antigone’s forbidden defiance of Creon’s demands, driven by her familial attachments, makes an unintended political statement within the context of fifth century burial and kinship laws. Most fundamentally Antigone’s struggle with Creon is about her chthonic right to lament her family and to choose to remain with them over a new family through marriage.
Antigone’s brand of fifth century tragic heroism is transferable into a contemporary scene because she appears to actualize some of the greatest humanist ideals: sacrifice, perseverance, and integrity. Personal allegiance to her beliefs gives her the courage to stand up to her oppressor and to fight for what she believes in beyond regard for her own life.  “Tragic characters die but their principles live on.  They suffer, but something beautiful is made of their suffering.”9 Antigone’s characteristics dispose her well to those in need of an enduring archetype to inspire political change.  There is a “political history” that has emerged out of the many reinterpretations of Antigone which provides “new life” to the “activist tradition of political revolt”10 in which Antigone’s perseverance is universalized as a sign of the activist good.
Butler’s reading of Antigone represents a critical optimism in contemporary interpretation of the play. She demonstrates to us the productivity of the play for reflection on agency and activism within a liberal-democratic state. In addition to the rights of sexual minorities, Audronė Žukauskaitė states that Antigone’s lack of socio-ontological status and her refusal to follow the demands of the state align her with the unrepresented in society today such as “prisoners, political and economic refugees, asylum seekers…”11 She has come to represent, “a demand to recognize a range of rights for those historically excluded by various states” (TC, p. 26). For these authors and many others, Antigone heralds new political possibilities; discussion about her story opens up an important dialogue about the underrepresented today.  
It is also important to recognize, however, that as worthy as we may consider it to be, the political activism that Butler and others attribute to Antigone’s actions involves a retrospective fictionalization of her character. The activist power of Antigone’s speech acts, for example, is given such a status so that which motivates her, namely her natal commitment and her unique position within them, is forgotten. Butler states that Antgione challenges her gender by speaking publicly when she refuses Creon’s demands.
What she fails to note is that Antigone is familiar with speaking publicly because she has been her father’s eyes, during his years of exile (as seen in Oedipus at Colonus). In her speech with Creon, she continues her life’s role, now as the last of the Labdacids, standing for her family honor. Antigone believes that her agonistic interactions with Creon are required so that her appeal to the chthonic laws will be heard. The Thebans are aware that Antigone’s burial of her brother follows ancient unwritten laws connected to honoring the dead. All of these factors come together to allow Antigone to speak and be heard, not as an activist, but as a tragic hero whose noble claim to family and the rites of the dead must be listened to. Even if we limit the political value of her story to her immediate conflict with Creon and use these struggles as inspiration for activism it remains problematic. Her story as a model for activism ignores the extent of her tragedy.  Antigone remains an impelled and suffering woman whose duties to kinship and personal desire for rectitude transcend all other possible motivations. Her “good” hinges upon a self-destructive pursuit that brings no one peace.
As Butler suggests, Antigone is a figure of the in between, but her in between status is not justifiable or redeemable, nor should we attempt to make it so. Antigone is a brutalized, suffering woman whose personal attachments have led to her death. The ethical merit of her story lies within its capacity to provoke reflection upon the indifferent character of life, the universal plight of the suffering human soul, the amoral quality of desire without limits, and the danger of living a life where one’s very sense of self is constituted in the service of a person, family or thing. At Colonus, Steiner says, Antigone learnt “that only the full acceptance of death can yield a moral lastingness” (p. 251). In the Antigone, Antigone accepts death as part of her fate, as what she believes to be her inevitable and honorable end and the fulfillment of her bloodline, as a woman whose sense of self and personal identity is completely based in something that is beyond her.  
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